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BELLING THE CAT: THE CURIOUS
CASE OF THE NINTH SCHEDULE IN
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
-Karishma

D. Dodeja*

Abstract-Article 31B, and, correspondingly, the Ninth
Schedule, was inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment)
Act, 1951 as a measure to protect land reform laws from potential challenges on the touchstone of Fundamental Rights. The
Supreme Court in I.R. Coelho v. State of TN. qualified this protection by subjecting such laws to judicial review on the ground
of abrogation of the Basic Structure. While Coelho has led to
several inadvertent consequences which have been analyzed
in this paper, its subsequent clarification in Glanrock Estate
(P) Ltd. v. State of TN., I submit, has resolved the debate with
respect to determining the validity of the Ninth Schedule laws
by toeing the line of the text of Article 31B while ensuring conformity with the Basic Structure. I further argue for the irrelevance of the Ninth Schedule today in light of its meandering
focus and potential for abuse. Finally, I propose two alternatives
to contain the deleterious effects of Article 31B.
I. THE CONUNDRUM OF THE NINTH SCHEDULE
A. Background, Context and Relevance of the Ninth Schedule
The enactment of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 (hereinafter
"First Amendment") led to the insertion in the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter "Constitution"), of one of the most controversial provisions in Indian constitutional history-Article 31B and, correspondingly, the Ninth Schedule.' Article
B.A., LL.B (Hons.) (2012), National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR)
University of Law, Hyderabad, India. In memory of the late Mrs. Ahalya Williams, ex-Principal, C.S.I. Ewart Matriculation Higher Secondary School and the late and beloved Ms. Ankita
Raheja.
The validity of Article 31B was upheld in Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951
SC 458 : 1952 SCR 89.
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31B validates legislations from the day they are placed in the Ninth Schedule,
although, such legislations or its provisions may contravene Part III of the
Constitution that provides for Fundamental Rights.2 Further, such validation is
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal upholding
the constitutional invalidity of the said legislation or its provisions 3 and Article
31A.4
In a bid to free India from the scourge of the zamindari system, the
Constitution framers enacted Article 31B with the intention of protecting land
reform laws from judicial review on the touchstone of the fundamental right to
property (as it existed then). 6 Initially, the Ninth Schedule consisted of thirteen
laws, each aimed at land reforms; today, it consists of a myriad collection of two
hundred and eighty-four laws covering reservation, industries, trade and mines,
to name a few,7 earning the Ninth Schedule the reputation of a 'Constitutional
Dustbin'.8 At the last count, the Constitution (Seventy-Eighth Amendment) Act,
1995 added twenty-seven state-specific land reform legislations in the Ninth
Schedule. It is to be noted that Article 31B does not have an indicia of the kind
of laws that can be inserted in the Ninth Schedule and, although, is independent of Article 31A, the Legislature has conveniently resorted to granting fictional
immunity to purportedly unconstitutional laws by inserting them in the Ninth

2

3
4

6

Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 47 : (1955) 1 SCR 691.
Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, (1971) 2 SCC 893; State of U.P. v. Brijendra Singh, AIR 1961
SC 14 : (1961) 1 SCR 362.
Article 31B uses the words, "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in
article 31A..."; therefore, Article 31B operates in addition to, irrespective of and without prejudice to the laws for the acquisition of estates by the State which are protected from Article 14
(Equality before Law) and Article 19 (Right to Freedom, for instance, right to free speech and
right to freedom of trade) under Article 31A. Further, also note, Article 31C immunizes laws giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy from the purview of Articles 14 and 19 (as
above).
A.G. Noorani, Ninth Schedule and the Supreme Court, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY 731 (2007).
Jawaharlal Nehru commenting on the narrow scope of laws belonging to the Ninth Schedule: "It
is not with any great satisfaction or pleasure that we have produced this long schedule. We do
not wish to add to it for two reasons. One is that the schedule consists of a particular type of legislation, (land reform laws) generally speaking, and another type should not come in. Secondly,
every single measure included in this schedule was carefully considered by our president and
certified by him." id. at 731.
Article 19(1)(f) was repealed by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act (1978) (with
effect from Jun. 20, 1979).
For instance, Industries (Development and Regulation) Act (1951) (entry 88); Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act (1957) (entry 90) and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1973)
(entry 100). See V. Venkatesan, Frontline articles on I.R. Coelho (the Ninth Schedule case) and
Raja Ram Pal (the MPs expulsion case), LAW AND OTHER THINGS, (Feb. 7, 2007), http://lawando-

therthings.blogspot.com/2007/02/frontline-articles-on-ir-coelho-ninth.html (Progressive laws can
be placed in the Ninth Schedule if necessitated by urgent circumstances and if beneficiaries of
the legislation, i.e., those intended under the Directive Principles, can't wait for the judiciary to
resolve challenges.)
Rajeev Dhavan, ConstitutionalDustbin, TIMES OF INDIA, (Jan. 22, 2007), http://timesofindia.india-

times.com/edit-page/Constitutional-Dustbin/articleshow/1359898.cms.
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Schedule; although, it must be acknowledged and as is stated above, the last addition to the Ninth Schedule was in 1995.
The Supreme Court in its seminal judgment of I.R. Coelho v. State of TN.9
dealt with the ramifications of the fictional immunity granted by Article 31B and
threw open the doors to judicial review of the constitutional amendment inserting the unconstitutional law in the Ninth Schedule, including, of such laws, on
the touchstone of Part III and abrogation of the Basic Structure (hereinafter
"Impact Test"). The ratio decidendi of Coelho was further clarified in Glanrock
Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of TN. 0 wherein the Supreme Court reaffirmed the twoprong Coelho Impact Test for determining the constitutional validity of the Ninth
Schedule laws, that is, only laws which violate Part III and, consequently, the
Basic Structure will be deemed to be unconstitutional. This test, however, was
not applied by Justice Dalveer Bhandari in his dissenting opinion on severing the word 'unaided' from Article 15(5) in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of
India" which was subsequently rebutted by Justice B. Sudershan Reddy in Indian
Medical Assn. v. Union of Indial2 who applied a variation of the Impact Test,
that is, the Essence of Rights Test and upheld the validity of Article 15(5) in its
entirety. These differing interpretations of Coelho revealed the staggering fissures
in the judgment and although Glanrock Estate provided some much required perspicuity it didn't quite resolve the issues pioneered by Coelho, which is perceptible in K.T Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka.13
B. Foundational Premise and Hypothesis
The aim of this paper is to examine the ratio decidendi of Coelho and its subsequent application and interpretation by various High Courts and the Supreme
Court. Such a study is essential to understand the potential ramifications of
Coelho; specifically, to ascertain whether Coelho did in fact remodel the law on
the judicial review of Ninth Schedule laws or whether it was merely old wine in
a new bottle as constitutional amendments were in any event subject to the Basic
Structure. I argue that the novelty in Coelho was the subjection of the Ninth
Schedule laws to the Basic Structure albeit through the Part III test (as clarified
in Glanrock Estate) - a kind of reversal, rather, nullification of Article 31B. Based
on my analysis in Section B, I conclude that the Glanrock Estate clarificatory test
of Coelho is appropriate to determine the validity of Ninth Schedule laws.
In Section C, I also challenge the notion of the relevance of the Ninth
Schedule today and conclude with two alternatives to contain the effects of
9
1o

12
13

I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (1999) 7 SCC 580 (hereinafter "Coelho").
Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2010) 10 SCC 96 (hereinafter "Glanrock Estate").
Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 (hereinafter "Ashoka Kumar Thakur"
or "93rd Amendment Case").
Indian Medical Assn. v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 179 (hereinafter "IMA").
K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 (hereinafter "K.T. Plantation").
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Article 31B, that is, (i) repeal Article 31B, validate land reform laws under
Article 31A and insert a separate schedule in the Constitution containing such
protected laws; and (ii) amend Article 31B to include an indicia of the nature of
laws that can be protected under the said provision.

II. THE INFAMOUS COELHO AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. Coelho: As delivered in 2007
The Constitution (Thirty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 and the Constitution
(Sixty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1990 (hereinafter "Amendment Acts") inserted
the Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
1969 (hereinafter "Janmam Act") and West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act,
1979 (hereinafter "West Bengal Act") in the Ninth Schedule (entries 80 and
250, respectively). The Janmam Act vested certain lands, including forest land,
in the Janmam Estate, in the State of Tamil Nadu" and such provision was held
violative of the Constitution in Balmadies PlantationsLtd. v. State of TN. 5 as
such vesting of land was not deemed to be a measure of agrarian reforms under
Article 31A. Similarly, Section 2(c) of the West Bengal Act defining the word
'area' was struck down as unconstitutional by a division bench of the Calcutta
High Court in Paschimbanga Raya Bhumijibi Sangha v. State of WB.1 6 as it
didn't provide for a valid determination of 'area' for the assessment of land revenue. In light of the above judgments, the petitioner challenged the constitutional
validity of the Amendment Acts as the Ninth Schedule effectively validated the
Janmam Act and the West Bengal Act although they violated Part III, thereby,
immunizing them from judicial review and thus violating the Basic Structure.
The constitution bench noted the decision of the Supreme Court in Waman Rao v.
Union of India17 which held that constitutional amendments made after April 24,
1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati verdict) would be open to judicial
review on the ground of violation of the Basic Structure while acknowledging
that certain apparent inconsistencies in the said judgment will have to be considered by a larger bench of the Supreme Court. The constitution bench therefore
referred these issues to a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court.
The aforesaid bench held that laws, whether by amendment of any article of
Part III or by an insertion in the Ninth Schedule, which abridge or abrogate Part
III and therefore violate the Basic Structure are susceptible to judicial scrutiny.
The actual effect and impact of the law on Part III will determine whether it violates the Basic Structure as certain Fundamental Rights form a part of the Basic
14
15
16
F
1

Janmam Act, § 3 (1969).
(1972) 2 SCC 133.
1986 SCC OnLine Cal 87 : (1986) 90 CWN 1108.
(1981) 2 SCC 362.
Kesavananda Blharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (hereinafter "Kesavananda Bharati").
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Structure" (as defined above, "Impact Test"). Therefore, constitutional amendments made on or after April 24, 1973 whereby the Ninth Schedule is amended
would be open to judicial review purely on the ground of violation of the Basic
Structure which is reflected in Articles 14, 19 and 21, and the principles underlying the said articles. 20 Further the fictional immunity of Article 31B would not
prevent it from being tested on the touchstone of the Basic Structure. Glanrock
Estate's ratio takes this stipulation a step further by differentiating between mere
violations of Part III and those violations of Part III, which impact the Basic
Structure. Therefore, violations of Part III, which necessarily impact the Basic
Structure, will be held unconstitutional. The modus operandi of arriving at such
a determination as per Coelho is by applying the Impact Test (also known as the
"Rights Test") and the Essence of Rights Test (explained hereinafter). The Court
further directed the appeal on the facts to be presented before a three-judge
bench while negating challenges to Ninth Schedule laws that had already been
upheld by the Court and to actions taken and transactions finalized as a result of
the impugned legislations.
While a literal reading of Coelho blurred the distinction between ordinary legislation and a constitutional amendment, Glanrock Estate clarified that while an
ordinary law can be challenged on the touchstone of the Constitution 21, amendments will have to conform to the Basic Structure. However, do laws form a part
of the Constitution merely by being inserted in the Ninth Schedule via constitutional amendments or do they owe their validity to the exercise of the amending power? 22 It is essential to note that Glanrock Estate acknowledges that such
laws are also open to being tested on the ground of legislative competency, which
implies that Ninth Schedule laws are not a part of the Constitution. This leads
to the question of the separation of the law from the body of the amendment;
as the constitutional amendment in respect of the Ninth Schedule is the law
itself, the actual implication of Coelho would now be that Ninth Schedule laws
are therefore subject to the Basic Structure although they are per se not a part
of the Constitution and have not been enacted under the constituent power of

19

20

21

22

See the clarification by Justice Khanna in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC
1 (hereinafter "Indira Gandhi"), ¶ 251 of his opinion in Kesavananda Bharati on Fundamental
Rights being a part of the Basic Structure.
Subhash Kashyap, Ninth Schedule Can't Help, TRIBUNE INDIA, (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070129/edit.htm#4. ("Rights such as 'equality', 'freedom' and 'life' are
considered 'fundamental' and therefore are not bamboos that will bend to accommodate passing
political winds.")
See the opinion of Justice Chandrachud in Indira Gandhi, 1975 Supp SCC 1, at ¶ 691 wherein
he had stated that the validity of ordinary laws can be tested on the basis of: (i) legislative
competency; and (ii) Articles 13(1) and 13(2) of the Constitution. As the Basic Structure is an
extra-constitutional creation and does not fall within the purview of the above two grounds, it
sets the foundation for examining the validity of constitutional amendments only and not ordinary laws, as decided by the Supreme Court majority of 3:1 in Indira Gandhi.
H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 30-48 (4 th ed. 2013).
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the Parliament. 23 In a way Coelho can be viewed as a triumph of Part III albeit
through the device of the Basic Structure. 2 4 Adversely, however, Coelho gave
birth to new superfluous concepts, which are examined subsequently.

B. The 93rd Amendment Case: The New Interpretation of Coelho
An apposite yet simplistic application of Coelho is seen in Justice Dalveer
Bhandari's dissenting opinion in the 93rd Amendment Case.25 The Supreme Court
(among other issues) had to determine whether a citizen's right to carry on occupation under Article 19(1)(g) was abrogated due to the imposition of reservations
by the State on private unaided non-minority educational institutions thereby
allegedly violating the Basic Structure. 2 6 In the absence of a challenge by the said
institutions, the Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan chose not to rule on the issue;
however, Justice Bhandari determined that the reference to 'unaided' in Article
15(5) should be severed as it was ultra vires the Constitution. It is relevant to note
that the Supreme Court was also required to determine the validity of Article
15(5) on the touchstone of the Basic Structure. The Chief Justice upheld Article
15(5) stating as follows:
"If any Constitution amendment is made which moderately
abridges or alters the equality principle or the principles under
Article 19(1)(g), it cannot be said that it violates the basic structure of the Constitution27 (emphasis supplied)."

23
24

25
26

27

Kamala Sankaran, From Brooding Omnipresence to Concrete Textual Provisions: IR Coelho

Judgment and Basic Structure, 49 J.I.L.I. 240, 248 (2007).
For subsequent applications of Coelho, see also Prem Singh v. State of H.P., 2012 SCC OnLine
HP 4249 (The Court entertained a challenge to a provision of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act (1972) (entry 73) on grounds of violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21. However,
the petition was dismissed as the appellants could not provide any tangible argument on the
violation by the provision of the Basic Structure); Musamiya Imam Haiderbux Rizvi v. State
of Gujarat, (2010) 13 SCC 752 (the Court upheld the validity of the Constitution (Sixty-Sixth
Amendment) Act, 1990 inserting the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act (1969) and Gujarat
Devasthan Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act (1977) (entries 213 and 215, respectively, in the
Ninth Schedule); Har Narain Devi v. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 2864 : ILR (2010)
1 Del 728 (DB) (The Court resisted a challenge to Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act
(1956) (entry 61) as the said legislation had been placed in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24,
1973).
Ashoka Kumar Thakur, (2008) 6 SCC 1, at ¶ 477-527.
The challenge in Ashoka Kumar Thakur was to The Central Educational Institutions
(Reservation in Admission) Act (2006) (hereinafter "CEI Act") enacted pursuant to Article
15(5) inserted via the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act (2005) (hereinafter "93rd
Amendment") which set out reservations of fifteen percent seats for Scheduled Castes, seven percent seats for Scheduled Tribes and twenty-seven percent seats for Other Backward Classes leading to the imposition of a total reservation of forty-nine in Central Educational Institutions (as
defined in the above statute).
Ashoka Kumar Thakur, (2008) 6 SCC 1.
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The Chief Justice did not delve into the italicized portion but based his rationale solely on defining the contours of a constitutional amendment and the Basic
Structure, which did not in any manner supplement or corroborate his rationale
above. While not explicitly stated by the Chief Justice, it is pertinent to note that
although Article 15(4) was already used by states to reserve seats in aided educational institutions,28 the statement of objects and reasons of the 93rd Amendment
(hereinafter defined) stated that Article 15(5) was enacted with the specific purpose of introducing reservations in unaided educational institutions as, "...at

present, the number of seats available in aided or State maintained institutions,
particularly in respect of professional education, is limited in comparison to
those in private unaided institutions". Therefore, although the question before the
Supreme Court was with respect to the validity of Article 15(5), which included a
reference to unaided private educational institutions, the Court ruled solely on the
validity of Article 15(5) vis-h-vis State-aided educational institutions.
In the backdrop of the larger public interest, 29 Justice Bhandari dealt with the
issue by testing Article 15(5) on the basis of the following test:
(i) Does the law affect a facet of the Basic Structure?
(ii) If so, is the effect such as to alter the said facet's original identity?
An implication of the test, therefore, is that that the form of the amendment
is irrelevant; the consequence or its impact on the Basic Structure is the real
indicator of its validity.30 The consequence or impact is determined by whether
the law "abridges" or "abrogates" the Basic Structure - a matter of degree, this
arbitrary determination seeks to answer the question of the effect of the law on
the Basic Structure. Thus, a certain "abridgement" is permissible, that is, certain Fundamental Rights may be violated by the law but such violation should
not in any manner affect the sanctity of the Basic Structure. Without delving into the rhetoric surrounding the Golden Triangle (Articles 14, 19 and 21),
Article 15(5) was held by Justice Bhandari to be infringing Article 19(1)(g), thus
affecting a facet of the Basic Structure 3' as it eliminated the freedom of each
citizen under the aforementioned provision. Consequently, the second limb of
the inquiry was whether Article 15(5) "abridged" or "abrogated" Article 19(1)
(g). Relying on Justice Chandrachud's opinion in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of

2

Vivek Reddy, The Eight Fatal Sins of Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, LAW AND OTHER
THINGS,

(May 4, 2008), http://lawandotherthings.blogspot.in/2008/05/eight-fatal-sins-of-ashok-ku-

mar-thakur.html.
29
30
31

Ashoka Kumar Thakur, (2008) 6 SCC 1, at ¶ 477-478.
Coelho, (1999) 7 SCC 580, at ¶ 81.
See P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 8 SCC 139 (hereinafter "Inamdar") wherein
a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the State cannot impose quotas on unaided
(minority and non-minority) institutions as this would lead to nationalization of seats in the institution. As opined in Indian Medical Assn. v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 179, at ¶ 73, it was to
overcome this obstacle that Article 15(5) was introduced in the Constitution.
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India3 2 that, "[a] total deprivation of fundamental rights, even in a limited area,
can amount to abrogation of fundamental right just as a partial deprivation in
every area can", Justice Bhandari held that Article 15(5) abrogated every citizen's
and every unaided educator's right under Article 19(1)(g) and therefore the reference to 'unaided' under Article 15(5) should be severed as being ultra vires the
Constitution.33
It may be argued that Justice Bhandari's application of Coelho in Ashok
Kumar Thakur was: (i) unnecessary as there was no challenge by the private
unaided non-minority educational institutions; (ii) a re-affirmation of Inamdar
and, thus, an attempt at foiling the legislature's intention expressed through
Article 15(5); (iii) an exposition of the importance of Article 19(1)(g) with respect
to each individual's right to freedom of occupation vis-h-vis the other important
Fundamental Rights, such as, the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a); (iv) a
celebration of 'merit' though such concept is unfounded in our Constitution; and
(v) a way to justify his policy decision against reservations in the said institutions3 4, however, it can't be criticized as an incorrect application of the Impact
Test, although it can be characterized as repackaging the Impact Test. Coelho's
Impact Test as further clarified in Glanrock Estate was centered around a violation of Part III leading to an abrogation of the Basic Structure; however, Justice
Bhandari's Impact Test first examines the violation of a 'facet' of the Basic
Structure (which includes elements besides the principles underlying the Part III
rights) and subsequently its effect of altering the said facet's original identity,
which therefore implies that Justice Bhandari had in fact not applied the Coelho
Impact Test3 5 but generally the Basic Structure to test constitutional amendments.
C. IMA: Rebuttal to Justice Bhandari
The division bench of the Supreme Court in IAIL4, however, was not persuaded by Justice Bhandari's opinion. The Court disagreed with the application
of the Impact Test on the basis of the lack of clarity on the word 'law' as used in
Coelho, that is, whether it implied a constitutional amendment under Article 368
or a constitutional amendment placing a statute in the Ninth Schedule. Although
it may be acceded that Coelho is a Ninth Schedule-centric judgment, the Court
has in its conclusion taken great care to specify that while using the term 'law'
32
33

34

Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 ¶ 64.
See Sudha Tiwari v. Union of India, 2011 SCC OnLine All 253 : (2011) 2 ADJ 819, ¶ 23
(Pursuant to Article 141, the High Courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court) and
Sanject Shukla v. State of Maharashtra, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1672 : (2015) 2 Bom CR 267, ¶
85 cf Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1, ¶ 93
[Article 19(1)(g), as such, is not a facet of the Basic Structure].
It is relevant to note that Justice Bhandari was adjudicating on Article 15(5) and not the CEI
Act. See also M.P. Singh, Ashoka Thakur v. Union of India: A Divided Verdict on an Undivided

35

Social Justice Measure, 1 NUJS L. Rev. 199, 203 (2008).
It is to be noted that due to the added emphasis on Part III, the Impact Test was also known as
the 'Rights Test'.
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in either sense, i.e., 'whether by amendment of any Article of Part III or by an
insertion in the Ninth Schedule', 3 6 the Impact Test would be dispositive (as was
applied, somewhat differently, by Justice Bhandari).
In this respect, however, Justice B. Sudershan Reddy minutely notes that
Coelho states in its first principle that the validity or invalidity of the 'law'
will be tested on the principles in the judgment and draws specific reference to
paragraph 76 of Coelho wherein the Court has held that the Essence of Rights
Test3 7 will not be a satisfactory indicia to determine the validity of constitutional amendments that eliminate the applicability of an entire chapter of the
Constitution. Such constitutional amendments will have to be tested on the
basis of the Impact Test. The distinction between the Basic Structure and the
Essence of Rights appears to be unclear and begs the answer whether the Basic
Structure is anything if not a concept encapsulating the principles underlying the
Fundamental Rights in addition to those aspects that constitute its identity. M
Nagaraj v. Union of India3 8 (hereinafter "Nagaraj") based the Basic Structure
on the concept of 'constitutional identity' or the 'personality' of the Constitution
and postulated that a constitutional amendment cannot destroy such identity/
personality and consequently abrogate the Basic Structure.3 9 While the concept of 'constitutional identity' is essentially the Basic Structure, is 'essence of
rights' a superficial concept manufactured in Coelho and inadvertently attributed
to Nagaraj to capture the foundational values of Part III and the Rights Test, a
direct reference to the Fundamental Rights in Part III? I argue that it is technically impossible to differentiate between the Essence of Rights Test and the
Rights Test; further, that the Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur has faltered in its
application of Coelho as well. According to Justice Reddy's rationale, therefore,
the appropriate test for determining the validity of Article 15(5) was the Essence
of Rights Test and that since the truncation of "a small portion of one of the
activities of one particular occupation in the entire field of occupations",40 does
not lead to changing the identity of the Constitution or its over-arching principles
which can be gleaned across the equality, freedom and judicial review codes"
or, principally, its Basic Structure, Article 15(5) with respect to private unaided
non-minority educational institutions, was constitutionally valid. It is an open
question, whether violation of one individual's right under Article 19(1)(g) to
determine his/her admission policy violates its essence or is merely a grain in the
sand in the field of occupations that it doesn't subvert Article 19(1)(g).

36
37

38
39
40
41

Coelho, (1999) 7 SCC 580, at ¶ 81.
While the Court attributes the genesis of the 'Essence of Rights' test to Nagaraj, it is to be noted
that such phraseology is not used in the said judgment. Nagaraj uses the 'width test' and the 'test
of identity' in the application of the Basic Structure.
(2006) 8 SCC 212.
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, at ¶ 22 (hereinafter "Nagaraj").
Indian Medical Assn., (2011) 7 SCC 179, at 78.
Indian Medical Assn., (2011) 7 SCC 179, at ¶ 81.
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In a way Justice Reddy's rationale reintroduces the lost focus on Part III by
admitting that although there is a subversion of Part III, such 'truncation' doesn't
amount to a violation of the Basic Structure and, thus, leading to a proper application of Coelho. Coelho, unintentionally, and its applications subsequently, have
differentiated between the tests to determine the validity of constitutional amendments and those constitutional amendments that place laws in the Ninth Schedule;
that, while the former is to be tested on the touchstone of the Basic Structure, the
latter has to answer to a Part III violation leading to an abrogation of the Basic
Structure. Further, it is interesting that Glanrock Estate applies the Rights Test,
that is, that the alleged violation of the law has to directly correspond to a right
in Part III and not merely the 'essence' of the Fundamental Right in Part III, as
was also observed by Justice Reddy in IMA.

D.

Coelho Clarified: Glanrock Estate

The Glanrock Estate verdict of 2010 was deemed to have solved the riddle that was Coelho. As referred by the nine-judge bench in Coelho, the issue
before the three-judge bench was the validity of the Constitution (Thirty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1974 via which the Janmam Act was inserted in the Ninth
Schedule under Article 31B of the Constitution. The Court determined that the
Tamil Nadu Legislature was competent to enact the Janmam Act under Entry 18,
List II of the Constitution, and, applying the Impact Test, narrowed the issue in
the present case as below:
(i) whether the vesting of the forest land in the Janmam estate to the State
violated any rights under Part III of the Constitution; and
(ii) whether such violation led to altering the identity of the Constitution, that
is, its Basic Structure?
With respect to the first test, the petitioner alleged violation of Articles 14,
19 and 300A of the Constitution. While the grounds of attack on the basis of
Article 19 are unclear4 2 and Article 300A merely sets out a constitutional right
to property, which deprivation can be justified by authority of law, 4 3 the petitioners attempted an Article 14 violation on the basis of the non-application of the
Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter
"Ceiling Act"), as before the ceiling could be determined and compensation could
be paid under the said statute, the forest lands were vested in the State pursuant
to the Janmam Act.

42

43

While the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act (1978) (with effect from Jun. 20, 1979)
omitted Article 19(1)(f) providing for a fundamental right to property, it also inserted Chapter IV
containing Article 300A providing for the constitutional right to property.
The inadequacy of compensation due to the non-application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
was alleged to be a violation of Article 300A.
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The Court clearly demarcated the sphere of influence of the Ceiling Act and
the Janmam Act stating that while the latter was enacted to acquire the rights of
janmis in Janmam estates and to introduce ryotwari settlement; the former was
aimed at fixing a ceiling of agricultural land holding and to distribute the excess
lands to the landless and agricultural population. Therefore, the 'similarly situated' test will not have any applicability in such a situation; consequently, Article
14 is not violated in any manner. Since the first test has been answered in the
negative, the question of testing the amendment on the touchstone of the Basic
Structure therefore does not arise.
E. K.T. Plantation: Piercing the Basic Structure
In the backdrop of the controversy with respect to the legal right to property" the Government of the State of Karnataka via Notification No. RD 217
LRA 93 dated March 8, 1994 (hereinafter "Notification") under Section 110 of
the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter "Karnataka Act") brought
lands used for linaloe cultivation under the purview of the said statute; such lands
being previously exempt from its provisions under Section 107 of the Karnataka
Act. 5 While the appellant company attempted to obtain the benefit of such an
exemption and claimed ownership over the said lands (although the title of the
lands itself was in dispute), the respondent State taking recourse to the provisions
of the Karnataka Act4 6 claimed that the lands stood vested in the State as with
effect from the Karnataka Amendment Act, no 'person' other than a person cultivating the land personally was entitled to hold the land. Being a Ninth Schedule
statute and exempt from Part III, the appellants claimed that the powers granted
to the State to broaden the purview of the Karnataka Act by including lands
used for cultivating linaloe were excessive and, therefore, Section 110 and the
Notification were unconstitutional. The Court held that the Legislature in its wisdom had exempted certain lands from the application of the Karnataka Act under
Section 107 but had subjected it to Section 110 which in turn granted the State
powers to remove such an exemption and thus it was not a matter of the will of
the delegated, rather, legislative will. Another ground asserted by the appellant
before the five-judge bench was that the Notification was not laid before the State
Legislature as was prescribed in the Karnataka Act. This was held not to affect
the validity or the effect of the Notification.

44
45

46

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 300A.

Karnataka Act, § 107(2) also provided for a conditional exemption for lands used for linaloe cultivation and stated that notwithstanding the non-application of the Karnataka Act to such lands,
no person shall, after the date of commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment)
Act (1973) (hereinafter "Karnataka Amendment Act") acquire in any manner for the cultivation of linaloe, land of an extent which together with the land cultivated by linaloe, if any,
already held by him exceeds ten units. The Karnataka Amendment Act is entry 140 in the Ninth
Schedule.
Karnataka Act, § 79B(1).
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It is interesting that the appellant attempted to permeate the thick layer of
protection granted by Article 31B by resorting to the ground of excessive delegation of power which is usually seen in Administrative Law. Additionally, the
company had also contended that the enactment of the Notification necessitated
a hearing on lines of due process, however, the Court ruled that it was evident
from the wordings of the statute that the Legislature had deemed it fit to delegate
such power to the State Government. The Court in fact framed the question in
such a manner so as to test the validity of Section 110 and the Notification on the
grounds of the Basic Structure so as to trigger Coelho. It is pertinent to note that
the rigours in testing the validity of a constitutional amendment will not be applicable in the present case; however, neither is Part III available as a viable ground.
It then leads to the question whether excessive delegation of powers necessarily
violates the Basic Structure and by this, is the Court then determining new facets
of the Basic Structure thereby leading to the expansion of an indefinable concept?
The Court tested the validity of the Karnataka Act on the touchstone of
Article 300A which provided for deprivation of property by the 'authority of
law'. Needless to say that such law has to be constitutionally valid and further,
in the present case, the said legislation was protected under Article 31A providing for acquisition of estates by the State and thus immune from challenge under
Articles 14 and 19. The ground of attack was then mounted on the 'Rule of Law'
- a much recognized aspect of the Basic Structure. The Court in its endeavour
to fortify the presence of the Rule of Law in India and in its desperate bid to
encourage foreign investment47 interpreted Article 300A to include the two facets
of eminent domain, that is, deprivation of property for public purpose in return
for compensation which the State has to justify taking into account the legislative
policy, object and purpose of the Legislature and other related factors. It is to
be noted that K.T Plantation is not a strict application of Coelho and Glanrock
Estate and tests the validity of a Ninth Schedule legislation on the basis of the
Basic Structure itself.
F.

Gopal Singh: Negativing Challenges to Article 14

Although Article 31B explicitly immunizes legislations from Part III, courts
are open to entertaining challenges to the said legislations if there appears to be
a hint of a challenge to the Basic Structure. In the case at hand, the State had
acquired the surplus land of Gopal Singh (the appellant) in 1976; after appeals
by both the State and the appellant which were ordered in favour of the appellant in 1995, the State finally compensated him in 1998 and levied simple interest at the rate of interest of two and a half percent per annum on the amount of
4

See Indira Jaising, Ninth Schedule: What the Supreme Court Judgment Means,

REDIFF,

(Jan. 11,

2007), http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jan/11indira.htm wherein she had stated that "[w]e live
in times when the Supreme Court believes that liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation are
good for the country and any law that hinders these will violate fundamental rights and hence,
the basic features of the Constitution".
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compensation. The appellant contested that the said rate of interest was arbitrary,
illusory and unjust, particularly, as the State had withheld payment for a substantial period of time; therefore, that Section 19(6) of the Rajasthan Imposition of
Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (hereinafter "Rajasthan Act") (entry
79), a Ninth Schedule law violated Article 14 leading to a denial of economic
justice, thus violating the Basic Structure. While the division bench refused to
examine the issue of laches, it dismissed the writ holding that Section 19(6) had
to be placed in the context of its related provision which provided for acquisition of surplus land and the object of the Rajasthan Act, that is, agrarian reforms
and equitable distribution of resources. The levy of interest under Section 19(6)
vis-h-vis a higher rate of interest under other laws, such as those providing for
compulsory acquisition of land, is a reasonable and valid classification based on
intelligible differentia having a rational relation with the object of the Rajasthan
Act. Mere hardship cannot be a ground for claiming denial of economic justice, rather, the enactment of such a socio-economic legislation was viewed as
strengthening the Basic Structure, according to the Court. The appellant had
also attempted to argue deprivation of the right to property due to the delay in
the payment of compensation by the State, however, this was held untenable as
the right to property was now merely a constitutional right and not a part of the
Basic Structure.48

III. THE NINTH SCHEDULE AND ITS NINE LIVES
A. Ninth Schedule and its Lost Focus
The validity of Article 31B is indisputable; while it was enacted with the sole
intention of immunizing land reform laws, the said intention is not reflected in
the Ninth Schedule as it stands today. I analyze two Ninth Schedule legislations
below and argue that the Ninth Schedule: (i) is being utilized as a tool to protect
potentially litigious legislations; (ii) is and has been prone to abuse; and (iii) contains laws which are redundant today making it a 'Constitutional Dustbin' in the
true sense of the term.
(a) The Tamil Nadu Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Reservationof Seats in EducationalInstitutions
and of appointments or posts in the Services under the State) Act,

1993 (hereinafter "Tamil Nadu Act')
The Tamil Nadu Act (entry 257A) inserted by the Constitution (Seventy-Sixth
Amendment) Act, 1994 (hereinafter "Seventy-Sixth Amendment") provides for
sixty-nine percent reservation in educational institutions and government positions, that is, nineteen percent more than the fifty percent reservation that has
48

See Pushpaben v. State of Gujarat, 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 9756 : AIR 2015 Guj 31.
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been stipulated by the nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney
v. Union of India."
As per the statement of objects and reasons of the Seventy-Sixth Amendment,
while Article 31C amply protected the Tamil Nadu Act from Articles 14 and 19,
the Legislature sought to dodge the Article 15 challenge by inserting it in the
Ninth Schedule which provides blanket protection against Part III, thereby successfully evading Indra Sawhney as well. The question is, whether Article 31C
has been properly applied in the first instance? Article 31C reads as follows:
Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving effect to the
policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part
IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes
away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19; and no
law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be
called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such
policy . . >o (emphasis supplied).
Two points ought to be given consideration here:

.

The underlined portion in the provision was a substitution for the words "the
principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39" by section 4 of the
Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976. The aforesaid section 4 was
declared invalid by a 4:1 majority constitution bench in Minerva Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India51
The italicized portion of the provision was declared invalid in Kesavananda
Bharati.
While the above portions of Article 31C were declared unconstitutional, they
are still retained in the text of the Constitution and in a way have effectively nullified Article 31C. Arguendo, assuming that the application of Article 31C by the
Tamil Nadu legislature was apposite, the actual question then is, whether sixty-nine percent reservation vis-h-vis fifty percent or eighty percent guarantees an
equal social order? It is also pertinent to note that the Constitution framers did
not exclude an Article 15 protection from Article 31C.
While respecting the Tamil Nadu Act, the Supreme Court by its interim
order dated August 18, 1994 (hereinafter "Order") created additional seats for
general category candidates that were equal to the number of seats which the
general category candidates would have been originally allotted had the fifty
49

51
5

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : AIR 1993 SC 477 (hereinafter "Indra
Sawhney").
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 31C.
(1980) 3 SCC 625.
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percent reservation rule been applied in the first instance. The Supreme Court
by its order dated July 22, 1996 further directed the applicability of the Order
for the academic year 1996-1997 as well. The State of Tamil Nadu requested for
a modification of the Order in order to implement the Tamil Nadu Act in Voice
(Consumer Care) Council v. State of TN. 52 The division bench of the Supreme
Court in Voice observed that backward class candidates were availing eighty percent of the seats even in those seats set aside additionally for the general category
candidates on the basis of their merit. This was leading to a situation whereby
the interim Order was virtually ineffective as the backward class candidates were
still being allotted a bulk of the seats. Admitting that the legal issues at hand
were referred to a constitution bench, the Supreme Court negated the State's
request for modifying the Order. 53
(b) The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951
The Constitution (Thirty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereinafter "ThirtyNinth Amendment") inserted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951 as entry 88 in the Ninth Schedule as "progressive legislation conceived in
the interests of public was imperiled by litigation" (such as the challenge to the
nationalization of coal).54 Incidentally, the Thirty-Ninth Amendment also inserted
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Representation of the People
(Amendment) Act, 1974 and the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 in the
Ninth Schedule and introduced Article 329A in the Constitution in an attempt to
oust judicial review in relation to election matters of the Prime Minister, Mrs.
Indira Gandhi.
Indira Gandhi held certain portions of Article 329A as unconstitutional and
the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 repealed the provision entirely with effect from June 20, 1979. In the backdrop of the emergency
of 1975, the Thirty-Ninth Amendment further inserted The Monopolies and
52

53

54

Voice (Consumer Care) Council v. State of T.N., (1996) 11 SCC 740 (hereinafter "Voice").
See also, ET Bureau, Revisit quota laws, SC tells TN, Karnataka, ECONOMIC TIMES, (Jul. 14
2010),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-07-14/news/28443555_1_quota-law-tamil-nadu-backward-classes-apex-court (A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court asked the
Tamil Nadu government to place available quantifiable data in respect of reservations before the
State Backward Class Commission and restrained the Karnataka government from implementing its proposed reservation policy of seventy-three percent.); Maneesh Chhibber, In Fact: Why
Rajasthan's new reservation laws face tough court challenge, INDIAN EXPRESS, (Sept. 23 2015),
http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/why-rajasthan-reservation-may-run-afoul-of-constitution/#sthash.1BPvDDtg.dpuf (The Rajasthan Assembly has passed the Rajasthan
Economically Backward Classes (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions in the State
and of Appointments and Posts in Services under the State) Bill (2015), and the Rajasthan
Special Backward Classes (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions in the State and of
Appointments and Posts in Services under the State) Bill (2015) which will lead to instituting
sixty-eight percent reservation in educational institutions and government positions, that is,
eighteen percent more than the fifty percent mark prescribed in Indra Sawhney.).
Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, Statement of Objects & Reasons.

16

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

28 NLSI REv. (2016)

Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (entry 91), The Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971 (entry 92) and The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act,
1972 (entry 94), to name a few, in the Ninth Schedule.
The Thirty-Ninth Amendment was a perfect example of the abuse of the Ninth
Schedule and exposes the deleterious effects of having such an open ended provision in the Constitution. Further, even to this day, the Ninth Schedule has not
been altered to adequately reflect the ground realities" and remains akin to a
spam folder.

B. Basic Structure: Not so 'basic' anymore
The Basic Structure remains an omnipresent and indefinable concept often
accompanied by the word 'etc.' to signify that it is impossible to indicate all the
core features of the Constitution. The Indian judiciary has used the basic structure doctrine mostly to protect judicial power. The basic structure doctrine proceeds upon a distrust of the democratic process, which itself must surely be part
of the basic structure. In limiting the amending power, the basic structure doctrine in fact stifles democracy, a basic feature.5 6
Champions of the Basic Structure would argue that it is essential that an
evolving democracy such as India should possess a flexible judicial shield with
which to combat and restrict any (imminent or otherwise) potential excess of
power by the Legislature. They would argue that the constitutional scheme and
its identity be protected "to ensure continuity and within that continuity of identity changes are admissible depending upon the situation and circumstances of
the day" 7 . It is to protect and promote the will of the people who have given
themselves the Constitution and to ensure preservation of their rights and freedoms that it becomes relevant and extremely crucial to have the Basic Structure,
especially, in an era of vote bank politics. Besides, what good did precision and
perfection ever lead to?

C. How to bell the cat?
Article 31B was enacted with the sole intention of protecting land reform
legislations. What is surprising then is that although the Constitution contained
the simplistic Article 31A, the Constitution framers felt the need to protect
land reform legislations under Article 31B. For instance, the Janmam Act could
have been covered under Article 31A(1)(a) providing for "the acquisition by the
1 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1973) (entry 100) was repealed by the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, § 49(1) (1999); Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1969) (entry
91) was repealed by the Competition Act, § 66(1) (2002).
56 V Venkatesan, Act of Foresight, FRONTLINE, (Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.frontline.in/static/html/
fl2402/stories/20070209005101200.htm.
5
Nagaraj, (2006) 8 SCC 212, at ¶ 22.
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State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights". Admittedly, Article 31B provides for a broader protection against Part III than Article 31A which merely provides protection against
Articles 14 and 19; however I argue that land reform legislation themselves cannot possibly be examined on the touchstone of any other Part III provision other
than Articles 14 and 19. Furthermore, with the right to property no longer being
a Fundamental Right, save and except for a far-fetched Article 19(1)(g) challenge
to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, land
reform laws do not require protection from Article 19. From Section B.F, it is evident that challenges to Article 14 with respect to land reform laws are usually
weak and are negatived by the courts as they usually stem from inadequacy in
compensation.
However, the Constitution framers deemed it fit to enact another provision to
specifically cushion agrarian legislations in which case the Ninth Schedule today
deserves a clean-up by the removal of those laws that don't specifically deal with
land reforms. An alternative proposal would be to amend Article 31B by introducing specific indicia on the kind of land reform legislations that could be
granted the now limited protection of the Ninth Schedule. A more straightforward
approach would be to repeal Article 31B, to save land reform laws under the purview of Article 31A and to introduce a separate schedule in the Constitution to
specify the legislations that are being shielded by Article 31A.
With all its foibles and errors, Coelho has considerably altered the understanding of judicial review and highlighted the importance of the Basic Structure more
so in this day and age when Part III is no longer sacrosanct. Finally, I submit that
the Ninth Schedule is a creature of the 1950s, and, today, it requires a thorough
revisit and holistic revamp. The cat may have just outlived its nine lives.

